

# Flow-Driven ESG Returns

Philippe van der Beck<sup>1,2</sup>

May, 2023

---

<sup>1</sup>Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne (EPFL)

<sup>2</sup>Swiss Finance Institute (SFI)

What impact did ESG flows have on the realized returns to ESG investing?

# What impact did ESG flows have on the realized returns to ESG investing?

## Naive approach...

1. Flows to labelled ESG funds: \$200 Billion
2. Price impact from CAPM calibration:  $\approx 0.002$

$$\text{ESG Impact} = \$200 \text{ Billion} \times 0.002 = \$0.4 \text{ Billion}$$

## This paper...

1. New measure of total ESG flows by all investors: \$1.3 Trillion
2. Estimate willingness to substitute between ESG and other stocks from institutional portfolio holdings. Then derive ESG price impact:  $\approx 0.4$

$$\text{ESG Impact} = \$1.3 \text{ Trillion} \times 0.4 = \$520 \text{ Billion}$$

# What impact did ESG flows have on the realized returns to ESG investing?

## Naive approach...

1. Flows to labelled ESG funds: \$200 Billion
2. Price impact from CAPM calibration:  $\approx 0.002$

$$\text{ESG Impact} = \$200 \text{ Billion} \times 0.002 = \$0.4 \text{ Billion}$$

## This paper...

1. New measure of total ESG flows by all investors: \$1.3 Trillion
2. Estimate willingness to substitute between ESG and other stocks from institutional portfolio holdings. Then derive ESG price impact:  $\approx 0.4$

$$\text{ESG Impact} = \$1.3 \text{ Trillion} \times 0.4 = \$520 \text{ Billion}$$

# What impact did ESG flows have on the realized returns to ESG investing?

## Naive approach...

1. Flows to labelled ESG funds: \$200 Billion
2. Price impact from CAPM calibration:  $\approx 0.002$

$$\text{ESG Impact} = \$200 \text{ Billion} \times 0.002 = \$0.4 \text{ Billion}$$

## This paper...

1. New measure of total ESG flows by all investors: \$1.3 Trillion
2. Estimate willingness to substitute between ESG and other stocks from institutional portfolio holdings. Then derive ESG price impact:  $\approx 0.4$

$$\text{ESG Impact} = \$1.3 \text{ Trillion} \times 0.4 = \$520 \text{ Billion}$$

# What impact did ESG flows have on the realized returns to ESG investing?

## Naive approach...

1. Flows to labelled ESG funds: \$200 Billion
2. Price impact from CAPM calibration:  $\approx 0.002$

$$\text{ESG Impact} = \$200 \text{ Billion} \times 0.002 = \$0.4 \text{ Billion}$$

## This paper...

1. New measure of total ESG flows by all investors: \$1.3 Trillion
2. Estimate willingness to substitute between ESG and other stocks from institutional portfolio holdings. Then derive ESG price impact:  $\approx 0.4$

$$\text{ESG Impact} = \$1.3 \text{ Trillion} \times 0.4 = \$520 \text{ Billion}$$

# What impact did ESG flows have on the realized returns to ESG investing?

## Naive approach...

1. Flows to labelled ESG funds: \$200 Billion
2. Price impact from CAPM calibration:  $\approx 0.002$

$$\text{ESG Impact} = \$200 \text{ Billion} \times 0.002 = \$0.4 \text{ Billion}$$

## This paper...

1. New measure of total ESG flows by all investors: \$1.3 Trillion
2. Estimate willingness to substitute between ESG and other stocks from institutional portfolio holdings. Then derive ESG price impact:  $\approx 0.4$

$$\text{ESG Impact} = \$1.3 \text{ Trillion} \times 0.4 = \$520 \text{ Billion}$$

# What impact did ESG flows have on the realized returns to ESG investing?

## Naive approach...

1. Flows to labelled ESG funds: \$200 Billion
2. Price impact from CAPM calibration:  $\approx 0.002$

$$\text{ESG Impact} = \$200 \text{ Billion} \times 0.002 = \$0.4 \text{ Billion}$$

## This paper...

1. New measure of total ESG flows by all investors: \$1.3 Trillion
2. Estimate willingness to substitute between ESG and other stocks from institutional portfolio holdings. Then derive ESG price impact:  $\approx 0.4$

$$\text{ESG Impact} = \$1.3 \text{ Trillion} \times 0.4 = \$520 \text{ Billion}$$



# What impact did ESG flows have on the realized returns to ESG investing?

## Naive approach...

1. Flows to labelled ESG funds: \$200 Billion
2. Price impact from CAPM calibration:  $\approx 0.002$

$$\text{ESG Impact} = \$200 \text{ Billion} \times 0.002 = \$0.4 \text{ Billion}$$

## This paper...

1. New measure of total ESG flows by all investors: \$1.3 Trillion
2. Estimate willingness to substitute between ESG and other stocks from institutional portfolio holdings. Then derive ESG price impact:  $\approx 0.4$

$$\text{ESG Impact} = \$1.3 \text{ Trillion} \times 0.4 = \$520 \text{ Billion}$$

# What impact did ESG flows have on the realized returns to ESG investing?

## Naive approach...

1. Flows to labelled ESG funds: \$200 Billion
2. Price impact from CAPM calibration:  $\approx 0.002$

$$\text{ESG Impact} = \$200 \text{ Billion} \times 0.002 = \$0.4 \text{ Billion}$$

## This paper...

1. New measure of total ESG flows by all investors: \$1.3 Trillion
2. Estimate willingness to substitute between ESG and other stocks from institutional portfolio holdings. Then derive ESG price impact:  $\approx 0.4$

$$\text{ESG Impact} = \$1.3 \text{ Trillion} \times 0.4 = \$520 \text{ Billion}$$

# What impact did ESG flows have on the realized returns to ESG investing?

## Implications...

- **Impact investing has price impact**  
*\$1 flow from market portfolio to ESG portfolio increases aggregate value ESG stocks by \$0.4*
- **ESG returns driven by ESG flows**  
*Under absence of price pressure from ESG flows, ESG funds would have not outperformed the market from 2016 to 2021*
- **ESG flows affect cross-section of ESG stocks**  
*The ESG stocks that received higher flows had higher returns in the cross-section. Impact of flows stronger when stocks held by inelastic/passive investors*

# What impact did ESG flows have on the realized returns to ESG investing?

## Implications...

- **Impact investing has price impact**  
*\$1 flow from market portfolio to ESG portfolio increases aggregate value ESG stocks by \$0.4*
- **ESG returns driven by ESG flows**  
*Under absence of price pressure from ESG flows, ESG funds would have not outperformed the market from 2016 to 2021*
- **ESG flows affect cross-section of ESG stocks**  
*The ESG stocks that received higher flows had higher returns in the cross-section. Impact of flows stronger when stocks held by inelastic/passive investors*

# What impact did ESG flows have on the realized returns to ESG investing?

## Implications...

- **Impact investing has price impact**

*\$1 flow from market portfolio to ESG portfolio increases aggregate value ESG stocks by \$0.4*

- **ESG returns driven by ESG flows**

*Under absence of price pressure from ESG flows, ESG funds would have not outperformed the market from 2016 to 2021*

- **ESG flows affect cross-section of ESG stocks**

*The ESG stocks that received higher flows had higher returns in the cross-section. Impact of flows stronger when stocks held by inelastic/passive investors*

# What impact did ESG flows have on the realized returns to ESG investing?

## Implications...

- **Impact investing has price impact**  
*\$1 flow from market portfolio to ESG portfolio increases aggregate value ESG stocks by \$0.4*
- **ESG returns driven by ESG flows**  
*Under absence of price pressure from ESG flows, ESG funds would have not outperformed the market from 2016 to 2021*
- **ESG flows affect cross-section of ESG stocks**  
*The ESG stocks that received higher flows had higher returns in the cross-section. Impact of flows stronger when stocks held by inelastic/passive investors*

# Background and Related Literature

1. Drastic growth of the environmental, social and governance (ESG) investment industry in recent years
2. ESG funds had higher realized returns than market in recent years: Investors seem to be "*doing well by doing good*"
3. Wedge between *realized* and *expected* returns due to shifts in ESG preferences (Pastor, Taylor & Stambaugh, 2022)
4. But, for every buyer there is a seller. High willingness to substitute implies small impact (Berk & Binsbergen, 2022)
5. However, holdings data suggest low willingness to substitute between stocks (Kojen and Yogo, 2019)

# Background and Related Literature

1. Drastic growth of the environmental, social and governance (ESG) investment industry in recent years
2. ESG funds had higher realized returns than market in recent years: Investors seem to be "*doing well by doing good*"
3. Wedge between *realized* and *expected* returns due to shifts in ESG preferences (Pastor, Taylor & Stambaugh, 2022)
4. But, for every buyer there is a seller. High willingness to substitute implies small impact (Berk & Binsbergen, 2022)
5. However, holdings data suggest low willingness to substitute between stocks (Kojen and Yogo, 2019)



## Background and Related Literature

1. Drastic growth of the environmental, social and governance (ESG) investment industry in recent years
2. ESG funds had higher realized returns than market in recent years: Investors seem to be "*doing well by doing good*"
3. Wedge between *realized* and *expected* returns due to shifts in ESG preferences (Pastor, Taylor & Stambaugh, 2022)
4. But, for every buyer there is a seller. High willingness to substitute implies small impact (Berk & Binsbergen, 2022)
5. However, holdings data suggest low willingness to substitute between stocks (Kojen and Yogo, 2019)

## Background and Related Literature

1. Drastic growth of the environmental, social and governance (ESG) investment industry in recent years
2. ESG funds had higher realized returns than market in recent years: Investors seem to be "*doing well by doing good*"
3. Wedge between *realized* and *expected* returns due to shifts in ESG preferences (Pastor, Taylor & Stambaugh, 2022)
4. But, for every buyer there is a seller. High willingness to substitute implies small impact (Berk & Binsbergen, 2022)
5. However, holdings data suggest low willingness to substitute between stocks (Kojen and Yogo, 2019)

## Background and Related Literature

1. Drastic growth of the environmental, social and governance (ESG) investment industry in recent years
2. ESG funds had higher realized returns than market in recent years: Investors seem to be "*doing well by doing good*"
3. Wedge between *realized* and *expected* returns due to shifts in ESG preferences (Pastor, Taylor & Stambaugh, 2022)
4. But, for every buyer there is a seller. High willingness to substitute implies small impact (Berk & Binsbergen, 2022)
5. However, holdings data suggest low willingness to substitute between stocks (Kojen and Yogo, 2019)

## Background and Related Literature

1. Drastic growth of the environmental, social and governance (ESG) investment industry in recent years
2. ESG funds had higher realized returns than market in recent years: Investors seem to be "*doing well by doing good*"
3. Wedge between *realized* and *expected* returns due to shifts in ESG preferences (Pastor, Taylor & Stambaugh, 2022)
4. But, for every buyer there is a seller. High willingness to substitute implies small impact (Berk & Binsbergen, 2022)
5. However, holdings data suggest low willingness to substitute between stocks (Kojen and Yogo, 2019)

# Data and Variable Definitions

1. **Accounting and Stock Market Data:** CRSP & Compustat
  - Price of stock  $n$  at quarter  $t$  denoted  $P_{t,n}$
  - Shares outstanding normalized to 1
2. **Institutional Holdings Data:** Thompson s34 & s12 file
  - $Q_{t,n}^i$  denotes shares held by fund  $i$
  - $w_{t,n}^i = Q_{t,n}^i P_{t,n} / AUM_t^i$  is portfolio weight
3. **Mutual Fund Flows:** CRSP Mutual Fund Database
4. **Sustainability Characteristics:**
  - Revealed preferences measure from ESG funds' holdings
  - Refinitiv Carbon Intensity Data, Refinitiv ESG Scores, Fossil Fuel Indicator, and Sin Stock Indicator as robustness checks

# Data and Variable Definitions

- 1. Accounting and Stock Market Data:** CRSP & Compustat
  - Price of stock  $n$  at quarter  $t$  denoted  $P_{t,n}$
  - Shares outstanding normalized to 1
- 2. Institutional Holdings Data:** Thompson s34 & s12 file
  - $Q_{t,n}^i$  denotes shares held by fund  $i$
  - $w_{t,n}^i = Q_{t,n}^i P_{t,n} / AUM_t^i$  is portfolio weight
- 3. Mutual Fund Flows:** CRSP Mutual Fund Database
- 4. Sustainability Characteristics:**
  - Revealed preferences measure from ESG funds' holdings
  - Refinitiv Carbon Intensity Data, Refinitiv ESG Scores, Fossil Fuel Indicator, and Sin Stock Indicator as robustness checks

# Data and Variable Definitions

- 1. Accounting and Stock Market Data:** CRSP & Compustat
  - Price of stock  $n$  at quarter  $t$  denoted  $P_{t,n}$
  - Shares outstanding normalized to 1
- 2. Institutional Holdings Data:** Thompson s34 & s12 file
  - $Q_{t,n}^i$  denotes shares held by fund  $i$
  - $w_{t,n}^i = Q_{t,n}^i P_{t,n} / AUM_t^i$  is portfolio weight
- 3. Mutual Fund Flows:** CRSP Mutual Fund Database
- 4. Sustainability Characteristics:**
  - Revealed preferences measure from ESG funds' holdings
  - Refinitiv Carbon Intensity Data, Refinitiv ESG Scores, Fossil Fuel Indicator, and Sin Stock Indicator as robustness checks

# Data and Variable Definitions

- 1. Accounting and Stock Market Data:** CRSP & Compustat
  - Price of stock  $n$  at quarter  $t$  denoted  $P_{t,n}$
  - Shares outstanding normalized to 1
- 2. Institutional Holdings Data:** Thompson s34 & s12 file
  - $Q_{t,n}^i$  denotes shares held by fund  $i$
  - $w_{t,n}^i = Q_{t,n}^i P_{t,n} / AUM_t^i$  is portfolio weight
- 3. Mutual Fund Flows:** CRSP Mutual Fund Database
- 4. Sustainability Characteristics:**
  - Revealed preferences measure from ESG funds' holdings
  - Refinitiv Carbon Intensity Data, Refinitiv ESG Scores, Fossil Fuel Indicator, and Sin Stock Indicator as robustness checks



# Data and Variable Definitions

- 1. Accounting and Stock Market Data:** CRSP & Compustat
  - Price of stock  $n$  at quarter  $t$  denoted  $P_{t,n}$
  - Shares outstanding normalized to 1
- 2. Institutional Holdings Data:** Thompson s34 & s12 file
  - $Q_{t,n}^i$  denotes shares held by fund  $i$
  - $w_{t,n}^i = Q_{t,n}^i P_{t,n} / AUM_t^i$  is portfolio weight
- 3. Mutual Fund Flows:** CRSP Mutual Fund Database
- 4. Sustainability Characteristics:**
  - Revealed preferences measure from ESG funds' holdings
  - Refinitiv Carbon Intensity Data, Refinitiv ESG Scores, Fossil Fuel Indicator, and Sin Stock Indicator as robustness checks

## Measuring ESG tastes

- Identify 382 ESG mutual funds by matching fund names with a list of sustainability key words  
(Vanguard FTSE *Social* Fund, iShares *ESG* ETF, Calvert *Impact* Fund)
- Compute portfolio weight held by all ESG funds  $w_n^{ESG}$  by aggregating their holdings

---

---

| Year | # Funds | Avg. # Stocks | Total AUM (\$ Billion) | % Indexed AUM | Active Share |
|------|---------|---------------|------------------------|---------------|--------------|
| 2012 | 88      | 226           | 25.02                  | 0.16          | 0.69         |
| 2015 | 101     | 223           | 36.80                  | 0.24          | 0.68         |
| 2018 | 199     | 195           | 63.19                  | 0.22          | 0.63         |
| 2021 | 368     | 175           | 233.48                 | 0.50          | 0.57         |

---

---

## Measuring ESG tastes

- Identify 382 ESG mutual funds by matching fund names with a list of sustainability key words  
(Vanguard FTSE *Social* Fund, iShares *ESG* ETF, Calvert *Impact* Fund)
- Compute portfolio weight held by all ESG funds  $w_n^{ESG}$  by aggregating their holdings

---

---

| Year | # Funds | Avg. # Stocks | Total AUM (\$ Billion) | % Indexed AUM | Active Share |
|------|---------|---------------|------------------------|---------------|--------------|
| 2012 | 88      | 226           | 25.02                  | 0.16          | 0.69         |
| 2015 | 101     | 223           | 36.80                  | 0.24          | 0.68         |
| 2018 | 199     | 195           | 63.19                  | 0.22          | 0.63         |
| 2021 | 368     | 175           | 233.48                 | 0.50          | 0.57         |

---

---

## Measuring ESG tastes

- Identify 382 ESG mutual funds by matching fund names with a list of sustainability key words  
(Vanguard FTSE *Social* Fund, iShares *ESG* ETF, Calvert *Impact* Fund)
- Compute portfolio weight held by all ESG funds  $w_n^{ESG}$  by aggregating their holdings

---

---

| Year | # Funds | Avg. # Stocks | Total AUM (\$ Billion) | % Indexed AUM | Active Share |
|------|---------|---------------|------------------------|---------------|--------------|
| 2012 | 88      | 226           | 25.02                  | 0.16          | 0.69         |
| 2015 | 101     | 223           | 36.80                  | 0.24          | 0.68         |
| 2018 | 199     | 195           | 63.19                  | 0.22          | 0.63         |
| 2021 | 368     | 175           | 233.48                 | 0.50          | 0.57         |

---

---

## Measuring ESG tastes

- Identify 382 ESG mutual funds by matching fund names with a list of sustainability key words  
(Vanguard FTSE *Social* Fund, iShares *ESG* ETF, Calvert *Impact* Fund)
- Compute portfolio weight held by all ESG funds  $w_n^{ESG}$  by aggregating their holdings

---

---

| Year | # Funds | Avg. # Stocks | Total AUM (\$ Billion) | % Indexed AUM | Active Share |
|------|---------|---------------|------------------------|---------------|--------------|
| 2012 | 88      | 226           | 25.02                  | 0.16          | 0.69         |
| 2015 | 101     | 223           | 36.80                  | 0.24          | 0.68         |
| 2018 | 199     | 195           | 63.19                  | 0.22          | 0.63         |
| 2021 | 368     | 175           | 233.48                 | 0.50          | 0.57         |

---

---

## Measuring ESG tastes

- Compare portfolio held by ESG funds  $w_n^{ESG}$  to aggregate portfolio held by *all* mutual funds  $w_n^{MF}$
- Construct **ESG taste measure using revealed preferences:**

$$\tau_n^{ESG} = w_n^{ESG} - w_n^{MF}$$

1. Define ESG stocks as  $\tau_n^{ESG} > 0$
2.  $\tau_n^{ESG}$  is significantly related to sustainability measures
3.  $\tau_n^{ESG}$  is a long-short portfolio with 2.4 % 4F-alpha

*Note: This measures **perceived ESG** which may not be equal to **true ESG***

## Measuring ESG tastes

- Compare portfolio held by ESG funds  $w_n^{ESG}$  to aggregate portfolio held by *all* mutual funds  $w_n^{MF}$
- Construct **ESG taste measure using revealed preferences:**

$$\tau_n^{ESG} = w_n^{ESG} - w_n^{MF}$$

1. Define ESG stocks as  $\tau_n^{ESG} > 0$
2.  $\tau_n^{ESG}$  is significantly related to sustainability measures
3.  $\tau_n^{ESG}$  is a long-short portfolio with 2.4 % 4F-alpha

*Note: This measures **perceived ESG** which may not be equal to **true ESG***

## Measuring ESG tastes

- Compare portfolio held by ESG funds  $w_n^{ESG}$  to aggregate portfolio held by *all* mutual funds  $w_n^{MF}$
- Construct **ESG taste measure using revealed preferences:**

$$\tau_n^{ESG} = w_n^{ESG} - w_n^{MF}$$

1. Define ESG stocks as  $\tau_n^{ESG} > 0$
2.  $\tau_n^{ESG}$  is significantly related to sustainability measures
3.  $\tau_n^{ESG}$  is a long-short portfolio with 2.4 % 4F-alpha

*Note: This measures **perceived ESG** which may not be equal to **true ESG***



## Measuring ESG tastes

- Compare portfolio held by ESG funds  $w_n^{ESG}$  to aggregate portfolio held by *all* mutual funds  $w_n^{MF}$
- Construct **ESG taste measure using revealed preferences:**

$$\tau_n^{ESG} = w_n^{ESG} - w_n^{MF}$$

1. Define ESG stocks as  $\tau_n^{ESG} > 0$
2.  $\tau_n^{ESG}$  is significantly related to sustainability measures
3.  $\tau_n^{ESG}$  is a long-short portfolio with 2.4 % 4F-alpha

*Note: This measures **perceived ESG** which may not be equal to **true ESG***

## Measuring ESG tastes

- Compare portfolio held by ESG funds  $w_n^{ESG}$  to aggregate portfolio held by *all* mutual funds  $w_n^{MF}$
- Construct **ESG taste measure using revealed preferences:**

$$\tau_n^{ESG} = w_n^{ESG} - w_n^{MF}$$

1. Define ESG stocks as  $\tau_n^{ESG} > 0$
2.  $\tau_n^{ESG}$  is significantly related to sustainability measures
3.  $\tau_n^{ESG}$  is a long-short portfolio with 2.4 % 4F-alpha

*Note: This measures **perceived ESG** which may not be equal to **true ESG***

## Measuring ESG tastes


- Compare portfolio held by ESG funds  $w_n^{ESG}$  to aggregate portfolio held by *all* mutual funds  $w_n^{MF}$
- Construct **ESG taste measure using revealed preferences:**

$$\tau_n^{ESG} = w_n^{ESG} - w_n^{MF}$$

1. Define ESG stocks as  $\tau_n^{ESG} > 0$
2.  $\tau_n^{ESG}$  is significantly related to sustainability measures
3.  $\tau_n^{ESG}$  is a long-short portfolio with 2.4 % 4F-alpha

*Note: This measures **perceived ESG** which may not be equal to **true ESG***

# ESG stocks versus non-ESG stocks



## A New Measure of Flows into Managed Portfolios

- Compute portfolio share of each investor  $i$  at quarter  $t$  by projecting weights onto managed portfolios  $S$

$$w_n = \sum_{s=1}^S \beta^s w_n^s + a_n$$

where  $S$  includes ESG, market, industry and different style portfolios (value, growth etc.)

- Institution  $i$ 's dollars in ESG portfolio

$$A_{i,t}^{ESG} = \beta_{i,t}^{ESG} * AUM_{i,t}$$

- Total flow into ESG portfolio by summing changes in ESG-assets across all institutions (accounting for ESG return)

## A New Measure of Flows into Managed Portfolios

- Compute portfolio share of each investor  $i$  at quarter  $t$  by projecting weights onto managed portfolios  $S$

$$w_n = \sum_{s=1}^S \beta^s w_n^s + a_n$$

where  $S$  includes ESG, market, industry and different style portfolios (value, growth etc.)

- Institution  $i$ 's dollars in ESG portfolio

$$A_{i,t}^{ESG} = \beta_{i,t}^{ESG} * AUM_{i,t}$$

- Total flow into ESG portfolio by summing changes in ESG-assets across all institutions (accounting for ESG return)

## A New Measure of Flows into Managed Portfolios

- Compute portfolio share of each investor  $i$  at quarter  $t$  by projecting weights onto managed portfolios  $S$

$$w_n = \sum_{s=1}^S \beta^s w_n^s + a_n$$

where  $S$  includes ESG, market, industry and different style portfolios (value, growth etc.)

- Institution  $i$ 's dollars in ESG portfolio

$$A_{i,t}^{ESG} = \beta_{i,t}^{ESG} * AUM_{i,t}$$

- Total flow into ESG portfolio by summing changes in ESG-assets across all institutions (accounting for ESG return)

## A New Measure of Flows into Managed Portfolios

- Compute portfolio share of each investor  $i$  at quarter  $t$  by projecting weights onto managed portfolios  $S$

$$w_n = \sum_{s=1}^S \beta^s w_n^s + a_n$$

where  $S$  includes ESG, market, industry and different style portfolios (value, growth etc.)


- Institution  $i$ 's dollars in ESG portfolio

$$A_{i,t}^{ESG} = \beta_{i,t}^{ESG} * AUM_{i,t}$$

- Total flow into ESG portfolio by summing changes in ESG-assets across all institutions (accounting for ESG return)



## Flows into the ESG Portfolio



- ESG flow from labelled ESG mutual funds: \$200 Billion
- ESG flow from all 13F institutions: \$1.3 Trillion

# Identifying the causal link between ESG flows and returns

Why not directly regress ESG returns onto ESG flows?

$$\text{ESG-Return}_t = \mathcal{M} * \text{ESG-Flow}_t + \epsilon_t$$

- ESG returns and flows driven by many variables (ESG regulation, climate news etc.)
- Reversed causality: Flows chasing returns

Can we identify  $\mathcal{M}$  from holdings data?

# Identifying the causal link between ESG flows and returns

Why not directly regress ESG returns onto ESG flows?

$$\text{ESG-Return}_t = \mathcal{M} * \text{ESG-Flow}_t + \epsilon_t$$

- ESG returns and flows driven by many variables (ESG regulation, climate news etc.)
- Reversed causality: Flows chasing returns

Can we identify  $\mathcal{M}$  from holdings data?

# Identifying the causal link between ESG flows and returns

Why not directly regress ESG returns onto ESG flows?

$$\text{ESG-Return}_t = \mathcal{M} * \text{ESG-Flow}_t + \epsilon_t$$

- ESG returns and flows driven by many variables (ESG regulation, climate news etc.)
- Reversed causality: Flows chasing returns

Can we identify  $\mathcal{M}$  from holdings data?

# Identifying the causal link between ESG flows and returns

Why not directly regress ESG returns onto ESG flows?

$$\text{ESG-Return}_t = \mathcal{M} * \text{ESG-Flow}_t + \epsilon_t$$

- ESG returns and flows driven by many variables (ESG regulation, climate news etc.)
- Reversed causality: Flows chasing returns

Can we identify  $\mathcal{M}$  from holdings data?

# A Model of Demand-Shocks and Prices

- Investor  $i$  chooses an optimal portfolio  $Q^i$  across  $N$  stocks
- Price-Elasticity of Demand  $\zeta^i \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times N}$ :

$$\zeta^i = -\frac{\text{Change in Demand (\%)}}{\text{Change in Price (\%)}} = -\frac{\Delta Q^i / Q^i}{\Delta P / P}$$

1. Stock-Specific Elasticity:  $\zeta_n^i$ .  
Shell goes up by 1%, how much Shell stock does Blackrock sell?
2. Cross-Elasticity:  $\zeta_{mn}^i$ .  
Shell goes up by 1%, how much Exxon stock does Blackrock sell?
3. Aggregate Elasticity Matrix:  $\zeta$   
The ownership-weighted sum of investor-specific elasticities

# A Model of Demand-Shocks and Prices

- Investor  $i$  chooses an optimal portfolio  $Q^i$  across  $N$  stocks
- Price-Elasticity of Demand  $\zeta^i \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times N}$ :

$$\zeta^i = -\frac{\text{Change in Demand (\%)}}{\text{Change in Price (\%)}} = -\frac{\Delta Q^i / Q^i}{\Delta P / P}$$

1. Stock-Specific Elasticity:  $\zeta_n^i$ .  
Shell goes up by 1%, how much Shell stock does Blackrock sell?
2. Cross-Elasticity:  $\zeta_{mn}^i$ .  
Shell goes up by 1%, how much Exxon stock does Blackrock sell?
3. Aggregate Elasticity Matrix:  $\zeta$   
The ownership-weighted sum of investor-specific elasticities

# A Model of Demand-Shocks and Prices

- Investor  $i$  chooses an optimal portfolio  $Q^i$  across  $N$  stocks
- Price-Elasticity of Demand  $\zeta^i \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times N}$ :

$$\zeta^i = -\frac{\text{Change in Demand (\%)}}{\text{Change in Price (\%)}} = -\frac{\Delta Q^i / Q^i}{\Delta P / P}$$

1. Stock-Specific Elasticity:  $\zeta_n^i$ .  
Shell goes up by 1%, how much Shell stock does Blackrock sell?
2. Cross-Elasticity:  $\zeta_{mn}^i$ .  
Shell goes up by 1%, how much Exxon stock does Blackrock sell?
3. Aggregate Elasticity Matrix:  $\zeta$   
The ownership-weighted sum of investor-specific elasticities



# A Model of Demand-Shocks and Prices

- Investor  $i$  chooses an optimal portfolio  $Q^i$  across  $N$  stocks
- Price-Elasticity of Demand  $\zeta^i \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times N}$ :

$$\zeta^i = -\frac{\text{Change in Demand (\%)}}{\text{Change in Price (\%)}} = -\frac{\Delta Q^i / Q^i}{\Delta P / P}$$

1. Stock-Specific Elasticity:  $\zeta_n^i$ .  
Shell goes up by 1%, how much Shell stock does Blackrock sell?
2. Cross-Elasticity:  $\zeta_{mn}^i$ .  
Shell goes up by 1%, how much Exxon stock does Blackrock sell?
3. Aggregate Elasticity Matrix:  $\zeta$   
The ownership-weighted sum of investor-specific elasticities

# A Model of Demand-Shocks and Prices

- Investor  $i$  chooses an optimal portfolio  $Q^i$  across  $N$  stocks
- Price-Elasticity of Demand  $\zeta^i \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times N}$ :

$$\zeta^i = -\frac{\text{Change in Demand (\%)}}{\text{Change in Price (\%)}} = -\frac{\Delta Q^i / Q^i}{\Delta P / P}$$

1. Stock-Specific Elasticity:  $\zeta_n^i$ .  
Shell goes up by 1%, how much Shell stock does Blackrock sell?
2. Cross-Elasticity:  $\zeta_{mn}^i$ .  
Shell goes up by 1%, how much Exxon stock does Blackrock sell?
3. Aggregate Elasticity Matrix:  $\zeta$   
The ownership-weighted sum of investor-specific elasticities

# A Model of Demand-Shocks and Prices

- Investor  $i$  chooses an optimal portfolio  $Q^i$  across  $N$  stocks
- Price-Elasticity of Demand  $\zeta^i \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times N}$ :

$$\zeta^i = -\frac{\text{Change in Demand (\%)}}{\text{Change in Price (\%)}} = -\frac{\Delta Q^i / Q^i}{\Delta P / P}$$

1. Stock-Specific Elasticity:  $\zeta_n^i$ .  
Shell goes up by 1%, how much Shell stock does Blackrock sell?
2. Cross-Elasticity:  $\zeta_{mn}^i$ .  
Shell goes up by 1%, how much Exxon stock does Blackrock sell?
3. Aggregate Elasticity Matrix:  $\zeta$   
The ownership-weighted sum of investor-specific elasticities

## A Model of Demand-Shocks and Prices

- Now assume a dollar flow to the ESG portfolio  $w^{ESG}$  resulting in a demand shock  $F_t^{ESG}$
- In equilibrium prices have to change in order to induce investors to accommodate the flow
- It can be shown that this leads to a *realized* ESG return

$$\text{ESG-Return}_t = \mathcal{M} * F_t^{ESG}$$

where  $\mathcal{M} = (\sum_i Q^i \zeta^i)^{-1}$  is inverse of the aggregate price elasticity of demand

- Flow-driven ESG return depends on investors' willingness to substitute between stocks  $\zeta^i$

*How to identify elasticities from holdings data?*

## A Model of Demand-Shocks and Prices

- Now assume a dollar flow to the ESG portfolio  $w^{ESG}$  resulting in a demand shock  $F_t^{ESG}$
- In equilibrium prices have to change in order to induce investors to accommodate the flow
- It can be shown that this leads to a *realized* ESG return

$$\text{ESG-Return}_t = \mathcal{M} * F_t^{ESG}$$

where  $\mathcal{M} = (\sum_i Q^i \zeta^i)^{-1}$  is inverse of the aggregate price elasticity of demand

- Flow-driven ESG return depends on investors' willingness to substitute between stocks  $\zeta^i$

*How to identify elasticities from holdings data?*

## A Model of Demand-Shocks and Prices

- Now assume a dollar flow to the ESG portfolio  $w^{ESG}$  resulting in a demand shock  $F_t^{ESG}$
- In equilibrium prices have to change in order to induce investors to accommodate the flow
- It can be shown that this leads to a *realized* ESG return

$$\text{ESG-Return}_t = \mathcal{M} * F_t^{ESG}$$

where  $\mathcal{M} = (\sum_i Q^i \zeta^i)^{-1}$  is inverse of the aggregate price elasticity of demand

- Flow-driven ESG return depends on investors' willingness to substitute between stocks  $\zeta^i$

*How to identify elasticities from holdings data?*

## A Model of Demand-Shocks and Prices

- Now assume a dollar flow to the ESG portfolio  $w^{ESG}$  resulting in a demand shock  $F_t^{ESG}$
- In equilibrium prices have to change in order to induce investors to accommodate the flow
- It can be shown that this leads to a *realized* ESG return

$$\text{ESG-Return}_t = \mathcal{M} * F_t^{ESG}$$

where  $\mathcal{M} = (\sum_i Q^i \zeta^i)^{-1}$  is inverse of the aggregate price elasticity of demand

- Flow-driven ESG return depends on investors' willingness to substitute between stocks  $\zeta^i$

*How to identify elasticities from holdings data?*

## A Model of Demand-Shocks and Prices

- Now assume a dollar flow to the ESG portfolio  $w^{ESG}$  resulting in a demand shock  $F_t^{ESG}$
- In equilibrium prices have to change in order to induce investors to accommodate the flow
- It can be shown that this leads to a *realized* ESG return

$$\text{ESG-Return}_t = \mathcal{M} * F_t^{ESG}$$

where  $\mathcal{M} = (\sum_i Q^i \zeta^i)^{-1}$  is inverse of the aggregate price elasticity of demand

- Flow-driven ESG return depends on investors' willingness to substitute between stocks  $\zeta^i$

*How to identify elasticities from holdings data?*



# Estimating elasticities from trades (van der Beck, 2022)

- Use 13F filings to construct quarterly institutional trades from changes in shares held  $Q_{t,n}^i$

$$\Delta q_{t,n}^i = \log Q_{t,n}^i - \log Q_{t-1,n}^i$$

*Example: If Blackrock holds 100 shares of Apple in 2010 Q1 and 105 shares in 2010 Q2 then  $\Delta q \approx 5\%$*

- Regress trades  $\Delta q_{t,n}^i$  on quarterly returns  $\Delta p_{t,n}$  to infer elasticities:

$$\Delta q_{t,n}^i = -\zeta^i \Delta p_{t,n} + \text{Controls} + \epsilon_n^i$$

## Estimating elasticities from trades (van der Beck, 2022)

- Use 13F filings to construct quarterly institutional trades from changes in shares held  $Q_{t,n}^i$

$$\Delta q_{t,n}^i = \log Q_{t,n}^i - \log Q_{t-1,n}^i$$

*Example: If Blackrock holds 100 shares of Apple in 2010 Q1 and 105 shares in 2010 Q2 then  $\Delta q \approx 5\%$*

- Regress trades  $\Delta q_{t,n}^i$  on quarterly returns  $\Delta p_{t,n}$  to infer elasticities:

$$\Delta q_{t,n}^i = -\zeta^i \Delta p_{t,n} + \text{Controls} + \epsilon_n^i$$

## Estimating elasticities from trades (van der Beck, 2022)

- Use 13F filings to construct quarterly institutional trades from changes in shares held  $Q_{t,n}^i$

$$\Delta q_{t,n}^i = \log Q_{t,n}^i - \log Q_{t-1,n}^i$$

*Example: If Blackrock holds 100 shares of Apple in 2010 Q1 and 105 shares in 2010 Q2 then  $\Delta q \approx 5\%$*

- Regress trades  $\Delta q_{t,n}^i$  on quarterly returns  $\Delta p_{t,n}$  to infer elasticities:

$$\Delta q_{t,n}^i = -\zeta^i \Delta p_{t,n} + \text{Controls} + \epsilon_n^i$$

# Identification

- Prices and quantities are jointly determined in equilibrium:  
Need instrument (exogenous variation) for prices to identify elasticities!
- Intuition: To identify elasticity of investor  $i$ , use exogenous demand shocks by other investors  $j \neq i$
- 3 Sources of Exogenous Demand Shocks by *some* investors
  1. Flow-driven trades by Mutual Funds
  2. ESG Index Inclusions
  3. Dividend Reinvestments

# Identification

- Prices and quantities are jointly determined in equilibrium:  
Need instrument (exogenous variation) for prices to identify elasticities!
- Intuition: To identify elasticity of investor  $i$ , use exogenous demand shocks by other investors  $j \neq i$
- 3 Sources of Exogenous Demand Shocks by *some* investors
  1. Flow-driven trades by Mutual Funds
  2. ESG Index Inclusions
  3. Dividend Reinvestments

# Identification

- Prices and quantities are jointly determined in equilibrium:  
Need instrument (exogenous variation) for prices to identify elasticities!
- Intuition: To identify elasticity of investor  $i$ , use exogenous demand shocks by other investors  $j \neq i$
- 3 Sources of Exogenous Demand Shocks by *some* investors
  1. Flow-driven trades by Mutual Funds
  2. ESG Index Inclusions
  3. Dividend Reinvestments

# Identification

- Prices and quantities are jointly determined in equilibrium:  
Need instrument (exogenous variation) for prices to identify elasticities!
- Intuition: To identify elasticity of investor  $i$ , use exogenous demand shocks by other investors  $j \neq i$
- 3 Sources of Exogenous Demand Shocks by *some* investors
  1. Flow-driven trades by Mutual Funds
  2. ESG Index Inclusions
  3. Dividend Reinvestments

# Estimating Elasticities for all Investors

- Construct trades  $\Delta q_t^i$  for all 13F investors from 2010 to 2020 (household sector holds remaining shares)

## Estimation

Pool investors by institutional type and estimate elasticity via 2SLS

1. First Stage: *Construct exogenous shocks to prices*

$$\Delta p_{t,n} = \beta * \text{Demand Shock}_{t,n}^{-i} + \text{Controls} + \epsilon_{t,n}^i$$

2. Second Stage: *Identify elasticities from price shock*

$$\Delta q_{t,n}^i = -\zeta^i * \Delta \hat{p}_{t,n}^i + \text{Controls} + \epsilon_{t,n}^i$$



## Estimating Elasticities for all Investors

- Construct trades  $\Delta q_t^i$  for all 13F investors from 2010 to 2020 (household sector holds remaining shares)

### Estimation

Pool investors by institutional type and estimate elasticity via 2SLS

1. First Stage: *Construct exogenous shocks to prices*

$$\Delta p_{t,n} = \beta * \text{Demand Shock}_{t,n}^{-i} + \text{Controls} + \epsilon_{t,n}^i$$

2. Second Stage: *Identify elasticities from price shock*

$$\Delta q_{t,n}^i = -\zeta^i * \Delta \hat{p}_{t,n}^i + \text{Controls} + \epsilon_{t,n}^i$$

## Estimating Elasticities for all Investors

- Construct trades  $\Delta q_t^i$  for all 13F investors from 2010 to 2020 (household sector holds remaining shares)

### Estimation

Pool investors by institutional type and estimate elasticity via 2SLS

1. First Stage: *Construct exogenous shocks to prices*

$$\Delta p_{t,n} = \beta * \text{Demand Shock}_{t,n}^{-i} + \text{Controls} + \epsilon_{t,n}^i$$

2. Second Stage: *Identify elasticities from price shock*

$$\Delta q_{t,n}^i = -\zeta^i * \Delta \hat{p}_{t,n}^i + \text{Controls} + \epsilon_{t,n}^i$$

# Estimated Demand Coefficients

---

---

|                            | $\zeta^i$ Identified from Trades $\Delta q_{t,n}$ | $\zeta^i$ in Kojien and Yogo (2019) |
|----------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|
| <b>Pooled All</b>          | 1.054 (0.033)                                     | 0.282 (0.001)                       |
| <b>Pooled by Type</b>      |   |                                     |
| Mutual Funds               |   |                                     |
| <i>High Active Share</i>   | 3.198 (0.305)                                     | 0.744 (0.004)                       |
| <i>Medium Active Share</i> | 2.660 (0.298)                                     | 0.477 (0.004)                       |
| <i>Low Active Share</i>    | 1.296 (0.092)                                     | -0.142 (0.003)                      |
| Banks                      | 1.292 (0.118)                                     | 0.238 (0.002)                       |
| Pension funds              | 0.838 (0.081)                                     | 0.322 (0.002)                       |
| Insurance companies        | 0.387 (0.168)                                     | 0.321 (0.003)                       |
| Households                 | 0.724 (0.244)                                     | 0.530 (0.009)                       |

---

---

# ESG Elasticities and Cross-Elasticities

- Take elasticity of each investor and compute ownership-weighted average for each stock
- Buying \$1 of average ESG stock increases prices by  $\mathcal{M}_{ESG} = \$1.11$
- What happens to other ESG and non-ESG stocks?

|            | $\mathcal{M}_{ESG}$ | Cross-Multipliers ( $\times 10^4$ ) |                            |
|------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|
|            |                     | $\mathcal{M}_{ESG,ESG}$             | $\mathcal{M}_{NonESG,ESG}$ |
| Mean       | 1.11                | -0.86                               | -1.40                      |
| 10th Pctl. | 1.01                | -2.30                               | -3.23                      |
| Median     | 1.09                | -0.05                               | -0.12                      |
| 90th Pctl. | 1.25                | 0.43                                | 0.36                       |

## ESG Elasticities and Cross-Elasticities

- Take elasticity of each investor and compute ownership-weighted average for each stock
- Buying \$1 of average ESG stock increases prices by  $\mathcal{M}_{ESG} = \$1.11$
- What happens to other ESG and non-ESG stocks?

|            | $\mathcal{M}_{ESG}$ | Cross-Multipliers ( $\times 10^4$ ) |                            |
|------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|
|            |                     | $\mathcal{M}_{ESG,ESG}$             | $\mathcal{M}_{NonESG,ESG}$ |
| Mean       | 1.11                | -0.86                               | -1.40                      |
| 10th Pctl. | 1.01                | -2.30                               | -3.23                      |
| Median     | 1.09                | -0.05                               | -0.12                      |
| 90th Pctl. | 1.25                | 0.43                                | 0.36                       |

## ESG Elasticities and Cross-Elasticities

- Take elasticity of each investor and compute ownership-weighted average for each stock
- Buying \$1 of average ESG stock increases prices by  $\mathcal{M}_{ESG} = \$1.11$
- What happens to other ESG and non-ESG stocks?

|            | $\mathcal{M}_{ESG}$ | Cross-Multipliers ( $\times 10^4$ ) |                            |
|------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|
|            |                     | $\mathcal{M}_{ESG,ESG}$             | $\mathcal{M}_{NonESG,ESG}$ |
| Mean       | 1.11                | -0.86                               | -1.40                      |
| 10th Pctl. | 1.01                | -2.30                               | -3.23                      |
| Median     | 1.09                | -0.05                               | -0.12                      |
| 90th Pctl. | 1.25                | 0.43                                | 0.36                       |


## ESG Elasticities and Cross-Elasticities

- Take elasticity of each investor and compute ownership-weighted average for each stock
- Buying \$1 of average ESG stock increases prices by  $\mathcal{M}_{ESG} = \$1.11$
- What happens to other ESG and non-ESG stocks?

|            | $\mathcal{M}_{ESG}$ | Cross-Multipliers ( $\times 10^4$ ) |                            |
|------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|
|            |                     | $\mathcal{M}_{ESG,ESG}$             | $\mathcal{M}_{NonESG,ESG}$ |
| Mean       | 1.11                | -0.86                               | -1.40                      |
| 10th Pctl. | 1.01                | -2.30                               | -3.23                      |
| Median     | 1.09                | -0.05                               | -0.12                      |
| 90th Pctl. | 1.25                | 0.43                                | 0.36                       |

# ESG Flow Multiplier

By how much does \$1 ESG flow raise the value of all ESG stocks?





# Impact Investing at the Fund Level

---

---

|                                 | Deviation from S&P500<br>(Active Share) | Impact of 1\$ into fund <i>i</i> onto... |                          |               |
|---------------------------------|---|--|--------------------------|---------------|
|                                 |   | ESG<br>Stocks                            | Fossil<br>Fuel<br>Stocks | Sin<br>Stocks |
| TIAA-CREF Social Choice Fund    | 0.48                                    | 0.98                                     | 0.12                     | -0.02         |
| Calvert Social Investment Fund  | 0.72                                    | 2.71                                     | -0.11                    | -0.09         |
| Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund | 0.36                                    | 0.43                                     | -0.09                    | -0.10         |
| iShares MSCI ESG ETF            | 0.39                                    | 0.54                                     | 0.17                     | 0.05          |

---

---

1. Many ESG funds do not deviate from market
2. ESG funds differ strongly in their impact
3. New impact-criterion to distinguish ESG funds

# Counterfactual ESG Returns in Absence of ESG Flows

---

---

|   | Return | $\alpha$<br>(CAPM) | $\alpha$<br>(CH4 + Green) |
|---|--------|--------------------|---------------------------|
| <b>True Returns:</b><br>Empirically Observed                    |        |                    |                           |
| <i>Return (%)</i>   | 2.01   | 2.40               | 1.51                      |
| <i>t-statistic</i>  | (2.91) | (3.47)             | (2.01)                    |
| <b>Counterfactual Returns:</b><br>In Absence of Total ESG Flows |        |                    |                           |
| <i>Return (%)</i>   | 0.04   | 0.57               | -0.30                     |
| <i>t-statistic</i>  | (0.05) | (0.77)             | (-0.38)                   |

---

---

# Counterfactual ESG Returns in Absence of ESG Flows

---

---

|                                | Return | $\alpha$<br>(CAPM) | $\alpha$<br>(CH4 + Green) |
|--------------------------------|--------|--------------------|---------------------------|
| <b>True Returns:</b>           |        |                    |                           |
| Empirically Observed           |        |                    |                           |
| <i>Return (%)</i>              | 2.01   | 2.40               | 1.51                      |
| <i>t-statistic</i>             | (2.91) | (3.47)             | (2.01)                    |
| <b>Counterfactual Returns:</b> |        |                    |                           |
| In Absence of Total ESG Flows  |        |                    |                           |
| <i>Return (%)</i>              | 0.04   | 0.57               | -0.30                     |
| <i>t-statistic</i>             | (0.05) | (0.77)             | (-0.38)                   |

---

---

# Flows and the Cross-Section of ESG Returns

- Compute inflow into individual ESG stocks  $\Delta d_n$  (using fund flows and lagged portfolio weights)
- Model implies that flow-driven return is

$$\Delta p_n^{Flow} = \mathcal{M}_n \Delta d_n$$

- Simple cross-sectional regression over subset of ESG stocks using cumulative returns from 2016-2021

$$\Delta p_n = \beta \Delta p_n^{Flow} + Controls + \epsilon_n$$

1. If  $\beta$  significantly positive: Flows matter for cross-section
2. If  $\beta \approx 1$ : Model well-specified

## Flows and the Cross-Section of ESG Returns

- Compute inflow into individual ESG stocks  $\Delta d_n$  (using fund flows and lagged portfolio weights)
- Model implies that flow-driven return is

$$\Delta p_n^{Flow} = \mathcal{M}_n \Delta d_n$$

- Simple cross-sectional regression over subset of ESG stocks using cumulative returns from 2016-2021

$$\Delta p_n = \beta \Delta p_n^{Flow} + Controls + \epsilon_n$$

1. If  $\beta$  significantly positive: Flows matter for cross-section
2. If  $\beta \approx 1$ : Model well-specified

## Flows and the Cross-Section of ESG Returns

- Compute inflow into individual ESG stocks  $\Delta d_n$  (using fund flows and lagged portfolio weights)
- Model implies that flow-driven return is

$$\Delta p_n^{Flow} = \mathcal{M}_n \Delta d_n$$

- Simple cross-sectional regression over subset of ESG stocks using cumulative returns from 2016-2021

$$\Delta p_n = \beta \Delta p_n^{Flow} + Controls + \epsilon_n$$

1. If  $\beta$  significantly positive: Flows matter for cross-section
2. If  $\beta \approx 1$ : Model well-specified

## Flows and the Cross-Section of ESG Returns

- Compute inflow into individual ESG stocks  $\Delta d_n$  (using fund flows and lagged portfolio weights)
- Model implies that flow-driven return is

$$\Delta p_n^{Flow} = \mathcal{M}_n \Delta d_n$$

- Simple cross-sectional regression over subset of ESG stocks using cumulative returns from 2016-2021

$$\Delta p_n = \beta \Delta p_n^{Flow} + Controls + \epsilon_n$$

1. If  $\beta$  significantly positive: Flows matter for cross-section
2. If  $\beta \approx 1$ : Model well-specified

## Flows and the Cross-Section of ESG Returns

- Compute inflow into individual ESG stocks  $\Delta d_n$  (using fund flows and lagged portfolio weights)
- Model implies that flow-driven return is

$$\Delta p_n^{Flow} = \mathcal{M}_n \Delta d_n$$


- Simple cross-sectional regression over subset of ESG stocks using cumulative returns from 2016-2021

$$\Delta p_n = \beta \Delta p_n^{Flow} + Controls + \epsilon_n$$

1. If  $\beta$  significantly positive: Flows matter for cross-section
2. If  $\beta \approx 1$ : Model well-specified



# Flows and the Cross-Section of ESG Returns



# Impact of flows is larger for more inelastic stocks!

- Approximate flow-driven impact:  $\text{Impact}_n = \frac{\Delta p_n}{\Delta d_n}$
- Regress  $\text{Impact}_n$  on  $\mathcal{M}_n$  in the cross-section

|                 | Price Impact<br>$\Delta p_n / \Delta d_n$ |
|-----------------|---|
| const           | 1.809<br>(1.418)                          |
| $\mathcal{M}_n$ | 2.813***<br>(3.598)                       |
| Log ME          | -0.211***<br>(-4.488)                     |
| Beta            | 0.154<br>(1.313)                          |

## Impact of flows is larger for more inelastic stocks!

- Approximate flow-driven impact:  $\text{Impact}_n = \frac{\Delta p_n}{\Delta d_n}$
- Regress  $\text{Impact}_n$  on  $\mathcal{M}_n$  in the cross-section

|                 | Price Impact<br>$\Delta p_n / \Delta d_n$ |
|-----------------|---|
| const           | 1.809<br>(1.418)                          |
| $\mathcal{M}_n$ | 2.813***<br>(3.598)                       |
| Log ME          | -0.211***<br>(-4.488)                     |
| Beta            | 0.154<br>(1.313)                          |

## Impact of flows is larger for more inelastic stocks!

- Approximate flow-driven impact:  $\text{Impact}_n = \frac{\Delta p_n}{\Delta d_n}$
- Regress  $\text{Impact}_n$  on  $\mathcal{M}_n$  in the cross-section

|                 | Price Impact<br>$\Delta p_n / \Delta d_n$ |
|-----------------|---|
| const           | 1.809<br>(1.418)                          |
| $\mathcal{M}_n$ | 2.813***<br>(3.598)                       |
| Log ME          | -0.211***<br>(-4.488)                     |
| Beta            | 0.154<br>(1.313)                          |

## Impact of flows is larger for more inelastic stocks!

- Approximate flow-driven impact:  $\text{Impact}_n = \frac{\Delta p_n}{\Delta d_n}$
- Regress  $\text{Impact}_n$  on  $\mathcal{M}_n$  in the cross-section

---

---

|                 | Price Impact<br>$\Delta p_n / \Delta d_n$ |
|-----------------|---|
| const           | 1.809<br>(1.418)                          |
| $\mathcal{M}_n$ | 2.813***<br>(3.598)                       |
| Log ME          | -0.211***<br>(-4.488)                     |
| Beta            | 0.154<br>(1.313)                          |

---

---

## ESG Index Inclusion

- Stocks included in FTSE 4Good Index are strict subset of FTSE USA Index (Berk and Binsbergen, 2022)
- Regress Quarterly Returns onto Index Inclusion Dummy  $I_{n,t}^{4G}$

|  | Realized Returns |                   |
|--|------------------|-------------------|
| $I_{n,t}^{4G}$                                       | 0.009<br>(0.29)  | 0.001<br>(0.05)   |
| $I_{n,t}^{4G} \times I(\text{Tracked by ESG Funds})$ |                  | 0.068**<br>(2.38) |
| Observations   | 125263           | 125263            |

- Index additions have 6.8% return and 7.9% higher mutual fund ownership: Multiplier  $\frac{6.8}{7.9} = 0.87$

## ESG Index Inclusion

- Stocks included in FTSE 4Good Index are strict subset of FTSE USA Index (Berk and Binsbergen, 2022)
- Regress Quarterly Returns onto Index Inclusion Dummy  $I_{n,t}^{4G}$

|  | Realized Returns |                   |
|--|------------------|-------------------|
| $I_{n,t}^{4G}$                                       | 0.009<br>(0.29)  | 0.001<br>(0.05)   |
| $I_{n,t}^{4G} \times I(\text{Tracked by ESG Funds})$ |                  | 0.068**<br>(2.38) |
| Observations   | 125263           | 125263            |

- Index additions have 6.8% return and 7.9% higher mutual fund ownership: Multiplier  $\frac{6.8}{7.9} = 0.87$

## ESG Index Inclusion

- Stocks included in FTSE 4Good Index are strict subset of FTSE USA Index (Berk and Binsbergen, 2022)
- Regress Quarterly Returns onto Index Inclusion Dummy  $I_{n,t}^{4G}$

|  | Realized Returns |                   |
|--|------------------|-------------------|
| $I_{n,t}^{4G}$                                       | 0.009<br>(0.29)  | 0.001<br>(0.05)   |
| $I_{n,t}^{4G} \times I(\text{Tracked by ESG Funds})$ |                  | 0.068**<br>(2.38) |
| Observations   | 125263           | 125263            |

- Index additions have 6.8% return and 7.9% higher mutual fund ownership: Multiplier  $\frac{6.8}{7.9} = 0.87$



## ESG Index Inclusion

- Stocks included in FTSE 4Good Index are strict subset of FTSE USA Index (Berk and Binsbergen, 2022)
- Regress Quarterly Returns onto Index Inclusion Dummy  $I_{n,t}^{4G}$

|  | Realized Returns |                   |
|--|------------------|-------------------|
| $I_{n,t}^{4G}$                                       | 0.009<br>(0.29)  | 0.001<br>(0.05)   |
| $I_{n,t}^{4G} \times I(\text{Tracked by ESG Funds})$ |                  | 0.068**<br>(2.38) |
| Observations   | 125263           | 125263            |

- Index additions have 6.8% return and 7.9% higher mutual fund ownership: Multiplier  $\frac{6.8}{7.9} = 0.87$

## ESG Index Inclusion

- Stocks included in FTSE 4Good Index are strict subset of FTSE USA Index (Berk and Binsbergen, 2022)
- Regress Quarterly Returns onto Index Inclusion Dummy  $I_{n,t}^{4G}$

|  | Realized Returns |                   |
|--|------------------|-------------------|
| $I_{n,t}^{4G}$                                       | 0.009<br>(0.29)  | 0.001<br>(0.05)   |
| $I_{n,t}^{4G} \times I(\text{Tracked by ESG Funds})$ |                  | 0.068**<br>(2.38) |
| Observations   | 125263           | 125263            |

- Index additions have 6.8% return and 7.9% higher mutual fund ownership: Multiplier  $\frac{6.8}{7.9} = 0.87$

# Conclusion

- Instead of regressing ESG returns onto flows, I estimate the ESG flow multiplier structurally from holdings data
- ESG Flows have a large impact on the cross-section of prices and therefore the realized returns to ESG investing
- Under absence of price pressure from ESG flows investors would have had to make **return concession by investing according to their ESG preferences**

*What are the real effects on companies' investment?*

## Conclusion

- Instead of regressing ESG returns onto flows, I estimate the ESG flow multiplier structurally from holdings data
- ESG Flows have a large impact on the cross-section of prices and therefore the realized returns to ESG investing
- Under absence of price pressure from ESG flows investors would have had to make **return concession by investing according to their ESG preferences**

*What are the real effects on companies' investment?*

## Conclusion

- Instead of regressing ESG returns onto flows, I estimate the ESG flow multiplier structurally from holdings data
- ESG Flows have a large impact on the cross-section of prices and therefore the realized returns to ESG investing
- Under absence of price pressure from ESG flows investors would have had to make **return concession by investing according to their ESG preferences**

*What are the real effects on companies' investment?*

## Conclusion

- Instead of regressing ESG returns onto flows, I estimate the ESG flow multiplier structurally from holdings data
- ESG Flows have a large impact on the cross-section of prices and therefore the realized returns to ESG investing
- Under absence of price pressure from ESG flows investors would have had to make **return concession by investing according to their ESG preferences**

*What are the real effects on companies' investment?*

## Conclusion

- Instead of regressing ESG returns onto flows, I estimate the ESG flow multiplier structurally from holdings data
- ESG Flows have a large impact on the cross-section of prices and therefore the realized returns to ESG investing
- Under absence of price pressure from ESG flows investors would have had to make **return concession by investing according to their ESG preferences**

*What are the real effects on companies' investment?*

## References

- Kojien, R.S. and Yogo, M., 2019. A demand system approach to asset pricing. *Journal of Political Economy*, 127(4), pp.1475-1515.
- Berk, J. and van Binsbergen, J.H., 2021. The impact of impact investing.
- Pástor, Ľ., Stambaugh, R.F. and Taylor, L.A., 2022. Dissecting green returns. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 146(2), pp.403-424.
- van der Beck, P., 2022. On the Estimation of Demand-Based Asset Pricing Models (No. 22-67). Swiss Finance Institute.